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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we investigate the role of key industry and other stakeholders and their 
embeddedness in particular national contexts in driving the proliferation and co-evolution 
of sustainability standards, based on the case of the global coffee industry. We find that 
institutional conditions and market opportunity structures in consuming countries have 
been important sources of standards variation, for example in the cases of Fairtrade, UTZ 
Certified and the Common Code for the Coffee Community (4C). In turn, supplier 
structures in producing countries as well as their linkages with traders and buyers 
targeting particular consuming countries have been key mechanisms of standards 
transmission and selection. Unlike prior research, which has emphasized the role of 
global actors and structures in promoting – and hindering – sustainability initiatives, we 
argue that national economic and institutional conditions in consuming and producing 
countries have not only served as important drivers of standards multiplicity and co-
evolution, but also as catalysts for the entire global sustainability movement. 
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National Contexts Matter: The Co-Evolution of Sustainability 
Standards in Global Value Chains 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In absence of inter-governmental regulation, private actors, including corporations and 
NGOs, have in recent years been increasingly concerned with regulating transnational 
affairs, including the promotion of social equity and ecological sustainability in global 
production and trade practices (Bartley, 2007; Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Djelic 
& Quack, 2008; Gulbrandsen, 2008). The United Nations 2005 World Summit defined 
sustainability in terms of the ‘triple bottom line’ – economic prosperity, social equity, and 
environmental quality. While there is consensus about this generic definition (see also 
WCED, 1987), in concrete production and consumption systems ‘sustainability’ is 
constructed and contested both as a concept and objective by actors involved (Boons & 
Mendoza, 2010; Reinecke, 2010). Over time, this ambiguity along with diverging 
interests of sustainability promoters has contributed to the development of numerous self-
regulatory sustainability standards. Thereby, firms and other private actors co-define 
norms and certificates that actors in the value chain must adhere to in order to produce a 
sustainable product (Wijen & Ansari, 2007; Fransen & Kolk, 2007). 
Much of this has been studied from a global value chain perspective (Bernstein & 
Cashore, 2007; Muradian & Pelupessy, 2005; Bitzer et al., 2008). The global value chain 
literature (Gereffi, 1994; Gereffi et al., 2005) has helped draw attention to the role of 
firms and strategic lead actors in transnational governance processes (Bair, 2005). 
Meanwhile, social movement theorists have started to question the dominance of global 
firms in the rise of new institutional arrangements for industry regulation and described it 
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“as an outcome of broader conflicts about the power of states, markets, and civil society 
in a context of neo-liberal globalization” (Bartley 2007, p. 299). Yet, to date in particular 
the role of national economic and institutional structures in driving processes of 
transnational governance, including sustainability standards, has been largely neglected. 
In other words, the ways in which national contexts shape opportunity structures for the 
emergence of transnational regulators has not been sufficiently examined. In this paper 
we contribute to a better understanding of how the emergence and adoption of multiple, 
co-evolving sustainability standards has been affected by the embeddedness of key 
initiators and stakeholders, e.g. MNCs, producers, NGOs and development agencies, 
within particular national contexts. 
The global coffee industry provides an interesting empirical case to study this 
dynamic: Over the past twenty years, more than thirty corporate and multi-stakeholder 
standards have been developed, including Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliance, Utz Kapeh, and 
the Common Code for the Coffee Community which continue to co-exist (Kolk, 2005). 
In recent years, the co-existence of partially similar coffee sustainability standards has 
been subject of numerous studies (Muradian & Pelupessy, 2005; Kolk, 2005; Bitzer et al., 
2008; Reinecke et al. 2010). Yet, we still lack an understanding of what drives the 
multiplicity of sustainability standards. The phenomenon of standards multiplicity defies 
conventional wisdom that over time dominant standards solutions will develop – driven 
by the need of industry players for efficient institutional regulation (Liebowitz & 
Margolis, 1995) and the pressure of isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Recent 
studies suggest that the ambiguity and greater openness of ‘sustainability standards’ vs. 
technical standards (see for an overview, Nadvi & Wältring, 2002), and the ongoing 
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competition of standard organizations for ‘sustainable solutions’ has prevented standards 
consolidation (see e.g. Reinecke et al., 2010). In addition to that, however, we would like 
to explore, based on the case of the coffee value chain, how national contexts within 
which key value chain participants and other stakeholders operate have contributed to the 
proliferation and continued co-existence of sustainability standards.  
To study this phenomenon, we utilize concepts from co-evolutionary theory 
which has been proposed as a central concept in ecological economics (Kallis & 
Norgaard, 2010) and applied to understand reciprocal processes of adaptation – here: of 
stakeholders involved in setting and adopting standards – within multiple, changing 
environmental contexts (Lewin & Volberda, 1999, Gerrits, 2010). We combine co-
evolutionary concepts, such as standards variation, transmission and selection, with an 
organizational field perspective (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) on standards development 
and adoption, which allows us to examine interactions between key stakeholders, such as 
standards organizations, multinational and local firms, governmental actors and NGOs, in 
the process of standards co-evolution within different institutional settings.  
Findings from our study contribute, on the one hand, to a better understanding of 
the institutional conditions influencing the co-evolution of sustainability standards (see 
also Boons, 2009). We make the point that many standards, which compete at a global 
level today, were initially developed within particular national contexts by stakeholders 
located and operating in these contexts. These contexts, therefore, became an important 
source of standards variation, and they continue to influence the co-evolution of 
standards. On the other hand, we contribute to a more nuanced view of how the 
positioning of standard setters and adopters, such as multinational firms and producers, 
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within global value chains and national business and institutional contexts drives both the 
differentiation and partial convergence of sustainability standards. Our findings therefore 
add not only to the literature investigating the continued multiplicity of sustainability 
standards (e.g. Reinecke et al., 2010), but also address the institutional embeddedness of 
global value chains, and the complex – both local and global – involvement of private 
actors in processes of transnational governance (e.g. Bair, 2005; Sturgeon et al., 2008). 
Next, we briefly review the literature on sustainability standards in global value 
chains, with particular reference to the coffee industry, and introduce a co-evolutionary 
perspective on standards development. We argue that national context conditions have 
been systematically neglected and that a co-evolutionary field perspective may help bring 
national contexts back into the picture. We then discuss, based on multiple sources of 
empirical evidence, how national contexts have become important sources of standards 
variation in coffee and how they continue to influence standards transmission and 
selection in global value chains. We focus in particular on the standards Fairtrade, Utz 
Kapeh/Certified and the Common Code for the Coffee Community. With regard to 
standards initiation, we focus on the national contexts of the Netherlands and Germany 
within which these standards were developed. As for standards adoption, we look at both 
producing and consuming countries and their particular – facilitating and constraining – 
conditions for standard adoption. We finally discuss implications of our findings for 
ongoing debates as well as policy-making. 
 
PROMOTING SUSTAINABILITY IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS:  
A CO-EVOLUTIONARY FIELD PERSPECTIVE 
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The concept of global value chain (GVC) emphasizes the global scale and structure of 
many commodity chains as a result of the internationalization of production (Gereffi, 
1994; Gereffi et al., 2005). It also points to the fact that consumption of commodities is 
often distanced from various stages of growing and production (Princen et al., 2002). 
Coffee is a good example of a commodity product whose production and consumption is 
organized and distributed at a global scale (FAO, 2009). Coffee is produced in more than 
60 countries and generates income for more than 100 Million people worldwide. The 
largest coffee exporting regions in terms of volume are Brazil (33%), Vietnam (15%) and 
Colombia (8%) (see Figure 1); however, the largest greater region growing and exporting 
coffee is Latin America (FAO, 2009; ICO, 2009). At the other end of the product chain, 
the top coffee consuming (and importing) countries are USA, Germany, Japan, Italy and 
France, making up almost three quarters of world consumption. Similar patterns of global 
distribution can be found for commodities, such as tea, cocoa, and sugar. 
------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE  
-------------------------- 
With respect to its organizational structure, global value chains are constituted by a 
number of actors who add market value to a product at different stages of production. 
Taking the case of coffee, at the upstream end of the value chain, small producers, 
cooperatives, and farmers owning large plantations are responsible for growing and 
harvesting coffee plants. Across producing countries we find different distributions of 
single subsistence farmers who own a few coffee plants, small scale farmers who have 
organized themselves into collectives, and privately owned coffee plantations. Coffee 
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must be shelled and classified prior to export which is usually done by farmers. The 
resulting green beans then enter a trade chain which can consist of several steps, 
beginning with ‘coyotes’ that travel from farmer to farmer to buy their products, and sell 
it to coffee traders. The beans are then traded by exporting companies to intermediaries 
or directly to importers and roasters, mostly in developed countries. The largest 
roasters/distributors include Kraft Foods, Nestlé, Sara Lee and Procter & Gamble. Coffee 
is then sold to consumers through retailers, coffee shops and other outlets. Some 
distributors, such as Starbucks, have their own coffee brands. In addition to direct sales, 
roasters sell coffee (often in combination with coffee machines and related products and 
services) to institutional customers as well as restaurants and hotels. 
Gereffi (1994) further distinguishes ‘buyer-driven’ and ‘supplier-driven’ chains 
depending on the ability and power of buyers or suppliers respectively to coordinate and 
impose control on other actors in the chain. The coffee value chain can be characterized 
as a buyer-driven chain, as a small number of large roasters generates by far the highest 
margin in the value chain, compared to numerous, often smallholder coffee farmers with 
no direct connection to, and little knowledge of, the world market for which they grow 
their products. As global value chains, by definition, span geographic boundaries, they 
also bridge national and regional systems of regulation. Whereas coffee roasters, for 
example, may be subject to sophisticated institutional regulation within their home 
countries, they maintain relationships with traders and suppliers who are mostly located 
in economies with more lax institutional regulation, e.g. when it comes to protection of 
environments and labor conditions. Powerful buyers have exploited this disparity by 
using cheap labor and natural resources in little regulated environments to reap margins 
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from highly dependent suppliers. This has contributed to continued cost pressure and 
conditions under which many farmers have great difficulties securing sustainable 
livelihoods, while also protecting the natural environment. 
To address this situation, various attempts have been made to regulate coffee 
production and trade, thereby promoting fairness and environmental sustainability. One 
historically important regulatory institution was the International Coffee Agreement 
(ICA). In 1962, 58 producing and consuming countries set up the ICA to protect growing 
regions from significant price fluctuations, and to stabilize coffee supply along the value 
chain (Pichop & Kemegue, 2005/6). The ICA involved a quota system which regulated 
the annual export volume as well as prices for each participating country. Over time, 
however, but in particularly in the 1980s, the ICA gradually lost its legitimate role as a 
regulating body. In particular, coalition prices increasingly deviated from free market 
prices as exporters from producing countries began to trade with non-member importing 
countries for lower prices (Daviron & Ponte, 2006). The Worldbank’s policy towards 
market liberalization also put pressure on many developing economies to oppose the ICA 
(Akiyama et al., 2001). In 1989, members of the ICO failed to negotiate a new agreement, 
so that the quota system was abandoned. Other commodity industries, such as cocoa, 
have faced similar difficulties in reaching and maintaining binding intergovernmental 
agreements to protect the interests of producers vis-à-vis powerful buyers. 
  As a consequence of institutional failure at the intergovernmental level, price 
competition increased significantly among producers resulting in a further shift of 
economic power from producers to roasters (Petkova, 2006; Muradian & Pelupessy, 
2005). In addition, the market entry of new players, e.g. Vietnam and Indonesia, has 
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resulted in an oversupply situation making coffee growing and export even more 
competitive (e.g. MacDonald, 2007). Cost pressure has also led to quality problems, as 
farmers stopped investing in quality control and sustainable growing practices, and labor 
conditions deteriorated. In a number of consumer countries, as we discuss in more detail 
below, this situation has raised concerns among consumers and NGOs who started 
holding large multinational corporations, such as coffee roasters, accountable for their 
impact on labor and environmental conditions along the value chain.  
As a result, a number of ‘private’ and multi-stakeholder initiatives have been 
launched to promote more socially responsible and environmentally friendly practices of 
coffee production (see e.g. Petkova, 2006; Kolk, 2005). These initiatives have resulted in 
the development of sustainability standards which are now increasingly being adopted by 
coffee roasters and farmers’ cooperatives (see Figure 2). Examples include Fairtrade, Utz 
Kapeh, and 4C. Table 1 lists a number of important standards and summarizes some 
dimensions based on which they can be – and have been previously – compared, e.g. 
objectives, target groups and initiators (see also Muradian & Pelupessy, 2005; Kolk, 2005; 
Reinecke et al., 2010). Similarities include: goals (e.g. establishing sustainability criteria), 
and practices of certification. Also, almost all major standards address economic, social, 
and environmental sustainability. However, standards also have a number of differences, 
e.g. historical roots, regional origin, targeted users, level of stringency, rate of adoption in 
producing and consuming countries (see below).  
------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 AND FIGURE 2 HERE  
-------------------------- 
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We seek to better understand in this study what is driving the proliferation of partially 
similar sustainability standards and their adoption by producers and buyers in global 
value chains. Most previous studies have primarily focused on categorizing different 
standards according to criteria listed above (see e.g. Muradian & Pelupessy, 2005; Kolk, 
2005). Only very recently, scholars have begun to provide explanations for the continued 
proliferation of standards and the lack of consolidation into a single solution (see e.g. 
Reinecke et al., 2010). Reinecke et al. (2010) argue that different ideologies of standard 
organizations, as well as processes of reciprocal positioning, e.g. as base vs. gold, or 
niche vs. mainstream standards, have contributed to standards differentiation and co-
existence. We add to this research, while we focus on a largely neglected dimension – the 
role of national economic and institutional contexts in initial development and adoption 
of sustainability standards over time.  
To analyze this dimension, we apply concepts from co-evolutionary theory, which 
has been employed as an analytical framework in various contexts, in particular to study 
dynamic processes, e.g. the development of industries and supporting institutions 
(Murmann, 2003), the emergence of new organizational forms (Lewin & Volberda, 2003), 
as well as the way in which social and ecological systems are linked in reciprocal 
structural change (Gerrits, 2008, Moreno-Peñaranda & Kallis, 2010). Co-evolution means 
that entities which are part of a larger system influence each other’s evolution (Kallis & 
Norgaard, 2010, Lewin & Volberda, 1999). Standards are entities whose development 
can be seen as part of an evolving ‘organizational field’, which in general includes “… 
those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: 
key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other 
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organizations that produce similar services or products […]” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 
148). In our case, the field is constituted by MNCs, standards organizations, consumers, 
NGOs and local producers. A field perspective, which looks at populations of different 
actor groups and their relationships, helps analyze standards co-evolution as a dynamic 
process of standards variation, transmission and selection. A co-evolutionary field 
perspective also helps combine multiple levels (e.g. firm-level decisions, industry 
evolution, institutional practices), accounting for multidirectional causalities, path 
dependencies and non-linear feedbacks between organizational and individual decisions 
and environmental conditions (Lewin & Volberda, 1999). 
Importantly, to better understand standards co-evolution and adoption, we not 
only need to look at standards offerings and adopting practices, but at co-evolving 
relations and influences between standards and standards organizations, adopting firms 
and other stakeholders at multiple geographic levels, e.g. national business systems and 
global production systems (Dicken et al., 2001). For this purpose, a co-evolutionary field 
perspective can be helpful as it looks at collaborative and competitive relations between 
the “totality of relevant actors […] involved in a common enterprise” (p.148) – here: the 
development/adoption of sustainability standards – including firms and standard 
organizations, but also consumers, NGOs and governmental agencies. An organizational 
field emerges – both within and across geographic contexts, e.g. national business 
systems (Whitley, 1999) – through the increased interaction between organizations, 
resulting in shared practices, rules and norms. DiMaggio and Powell’s distinct 
contribution is that they develop hypotheses about the way in which increased interaction 
leads to isomorphism, i.e. homogenization of organizational practices. Later contributions 
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to the field concept have stressed that they may exhibit competing sets of norms (Galvin 
et al., 2004).  
In order to analyze co-evolutionary field dynamics of standards development and 
adoption, we look at drivers and mechanisms of standards variation, transmission and 
selection as shaping these fields (Boons, 2009), looking at standards not in isolation but 
as co-evolving in an emerging field of standard production. The following concepts are 
taken from evolutionary theory in biology, and have been applied to economics and 
social phenomena (Blute, 2010; Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
The concept of variation – here: in the population of standards – originates in the 
idea taken from biology that mutations of genetic material may occur in the reproduction 
of genes and species. In social contexts, variation means that the reproduction of 
established social norms, practices and structures is paralleled by deviations from these 
norms, practices and structures in the way social actors interact and organize themselves. 
Variations may be responses to idiosyncratic and/or changing environmental conditions. 
For example certain external events or shocks, such as the dismantling of the ICA in the 
coffee industry, create new problems, such as price wars, to which actors respond. Also, 
from a co-evolutionary perspective, the entrance of new standards may alter economic 
and political conditions and opportunity structures. In face of such situations, actors may 
engage in search processes for strategic responses and practices addressing them. This 
may also lead them to rethink their current strategies. The spectrum of potential responses 
varies by the ‘degree of freedom’ of actors, e.g. political and economic opportunity 
structures that provide access to resources of power to engage in certain actions. We here 
suggest – as we show below – that the embeddedness of actors in particular national 
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contexts is an important factor influencing political and economic opportunity structures, 
and thus the variation they produce. 
The concept of transmission captures how a particular practice, rule or principle is 
‘transmitted’ between organizations. In our context, we are interested in particular in how 
standards are transmitted to producers as adopters of these standards. Once transmitted, 
these practices may get more or less integrated into an established system of activities, 
which then promotes retention of these practices. From an institutional perspective, 
transmission and retention are key aspects in the institutionalization of norms and 
practices. To analyze processes of transmission, the various ways in which participants in 
a particular field interact and interrelate need to be understood. For example, transmission 
can be promoted by imitation processes through mutual observation. Or, it can result 
from regulation of interactions and practices through a central institution, e.g. an industry 
association. Personal networks and rotation of individuals across organizations may also 
promote transmission processes. In the example of standards, as we show below, 
standards organizations, buyers and intermediaries may be important transmitters of 
standards practices and principles. Importantly, standards are not transmitted in isolation, 
but as they co-evolve with – and thereby position themselves towards or in opposition to 
– other standards (see also Reinecke et al., 2010).  
The notion of selection captures processes and mechanisms leading to reduction 
of variety as a result of competitive and other selection pressures. Related to this concept 
is the idea that practices, norms and other social ‘elements’ need to ‘fit’ within existing – 
yet ever changing – systems in order to establish and ‘survive’. Selection pressure further 
varies by the level of variety ‘allowed’ in a given system or market. In the context of 
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standards, for example, we need to understand how certain standards or criteria for 
adoption become more favorable than others and what impact national contexts have on 
selection processes. Selection in our context may mean that certain standards rather than 
others get adopted in particular regions, but also that standards become similar or 
converge on certain dimensions, to ease producer adoption.  
From a co-evolutionary field perspective, processes of variation, transmission, 
and selection may happen at multiple geographic and institutional levels, involving 
multiple actors taking part in the dissemination and adoption of practices and norms, such 
as particular standards. For example, both private firms and standards organizations – and 
other stakeholders – influence the co-evolution of standards. While standards 
organizations constitute a space for standards offerings that co-evolve over time 
(Reinecke et al. 2010), adopting firms bring about and reproduce certain adoption 
practices which, in turn, may affect the co-evolution of standards. Thereby, both 
individual and collective agency plays a critical role. In social contexts, variation, 
transmission and selection are not ‘automatic’ or ‘random’ processes, but rather the result 
of more or less reflexive entrepreneurship, political struggle and strategic intervention. In 
the following, we discuss such processes in greater detail.  
 
THE CO-EVOLUTION OF COFFEE SUSTAINABILITY STANDARDS AND 
THE ROLE OF NATIONAL CONTEXT CONDITIONS 
 
In the following, we analyze the co-evolution of sustainability standards in the coffee 
sector in more detail, focusing, on the one hand, on the role of key stakeholders of 
standards development and adoption in the global value chain, and, on the other hand, on 
the national contexts within which these stakeholders are embedded. The first part of the 
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analysis will focus on drivers of standards variation; the second part concentrates on 
mechanisms of standards transmission and selection.  
 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
We employ an embedded case study approach (Yin, 2003) to examine the co-evolution of 
sustainability standards and the role of national context conditions. The actual case is the 
global coffee value chain which we selected as a widely studied field for sustainability 
standards (Kolk, 2005; Muradian & Pelupessy, 2005). Within this field we focus on three 
particular sustainability standards as embedded cases – Fairtrade (Max Havelaar), Utz 
Kapeh and the Common Code for the Coffee Community (4C). All three have been 
recognized as major sustainability standards (e.g. Kolk, 2005). They have different 
historical roots and target different segments of standards adopters. Over time they have 
co-evolved in an interdependent way, getting adopted to a different degree in different 
regions, which makes them interesting to study as embedded cases.  
Fairtrade represents a major social movement driven standard with stringent 
sustainability criteria and a fixed price premium for farmers. It targets small farmers 
organized in cooperatives and has remained a 'gold standard’ relying on socially 
conscious consumers. Fairtrade was established in 1988 and originates in the Netherlands 
(see also Table 1). Utz Kapeh/Certified is a more recent, private standards initiative 
launched in 1997. Unlike Fairtrade, it targets mainly big and medium enterprises and 
already enjoys rather wide coverage, in terms of volume certified (see Table 1). Like 
Fairtrade, Utz Kapeh was also initiated in the Netherlands through the Ahold Coffee 
Company (ACC) in cooperation with Guatemalan coffee suppliers. The Common Code 
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for the Coffee Community (4C) is a multi-stakeholder standard launched in 2004. It 
targets coffee producers and roasters of all sizes, and like Utz Kapeh/Certified it applies 
rather moderate criteria for adoption. In particular, it aims to abolish the worst business 
practices, e.g. child and forced labor; builds on the principle of continuous improvement, 
and focuses on raising coffee quality standards rather than guaranteeing price premiums. 
Historically, 4C originates in a collaborative initiative of major coffee roasters, including 
Kraft Foods (Jacobs) and Nestle, and the German Agency for Technical Development 
Cooperation (GTZ; now: GIZ) (see Table 1).  
To examine processes of standards variation, transmission and selection, focusing 
on the three standards introduced above, we utilize multiple sources of evidence, 
including industry statistics and reports, semi-structured interviews, personal 
observations, and participation in industry meetings. One major empirical source are 
three, partly independent interview series. The first series was conducted in 2001/2 and 
2006/7 by two authors focusing largely on the development of 4C (Total: 14 interviews), 
including interviews with corporate representatives, GTZ managers, and 4C 
representatives. The second series was conducted in 2008/9 by one author. It focused on 
the development and adoption of Fairtrade and Utz Kapeh/Certified, with particular 
emphasis on the Dutch context (Total: 10 interviews). It includes interviews with 
managers from coffee roasters and employees from the standards organizations Max 
Havelaar and Utz Certified. The third series was conducted between 2009 and 2011 by 
three authors. It focused on the more recent co-evolution and adoption of sustainability 
standards (Total: 20 interviews) and includes interviews with representatives of standards 
organizations, NGOs, and producing cooperatives. In addition, we collected archival data 
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and other materials. For example, we utilized online information; internal reports and 
documents produced by standards bodies and industry observers. Following the advice of 
Yin (2003), we make use of multiple sources of evidence, based on both qualitative and 
quantitative data. 
 The analysis of data is mainly inductive, yet guided by co-evolution theory as a 
‘sensitizing device’. This means that we specifically apply concepts from co-evolution 
theory as a lens through which we analyze drivers of the co-existence of sustainability 
standards and the influence of different actor groups and national contexts on standards 
co-evolution. We focus on the standards Fairtrade, Utz Kapeh/Certified and 4C. Using 
these examples, we look at standards variation – the increasing range of as well as 
changes in features of standards offerings; standards transmission – the transfer of 
standards elements among standards organizations as well as to standards adopters; and 
standards selection – the process by which certain standards or standards features 
‘succeed’ or become (more) legitimate.  
First, we seek to understand what role national context conditions – and actor 
groups operating and interacting within particular national business systems (Whitley, 
1999) – played as drivers of standards variation. Next, we look at mechanisms of 
standards transmission and selection, thereby again focusing on the role of key actor 
groups in different geographic contexts. Finally, we discuss how our findings help 
address the questions raised at the beginning of the paper. Also, we discuss implications 
not only for ongoing research on sustainability standards, but also for policy-makers.  
 
STANDARDS VARIATION: NATIONAL CONTEXT CONDITIONS AND 
GLOBAL ECONOMIC STRUCTURES 
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To understand the co-existence of multiple standards with partly similar, partly divergent 
objectives, target groups and other properties, we first identify sources and drivers of 
standards variation. Interview data suggests that more or less idiosyncratic regional 
economic and institutional conditions, situational conditions and market opportunities of 
initiating actors as well as their positions and interests in global value chains have jointly 
driven standards variation. We examine in particular the cases of Fairtrade, Utz Kapeh 
and 4C. In all cases, particular national contexts – the Netherlands in the case of Fairtrade 
and Utz Kapeh, and Germany in the case of 4C – provided favorable founding conditions 
for the creation of these sustainability standards.   
  
The emergence of Fairtrade coffee  
Ideas behind Fairtrade and the principle of empowering small farmers, including price 
premiums and collective representation vis-à-vis powerful buyers, date back to world 
shops set up in the late 1950s and solidarity trade initiatives in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
Fairtrade label was then established in 1988 based on a long-term collaboration of a 
Dutch development agency and Mexican farmers. At that time, the solidarity discourse, 
which promoted the establishment of the Fairtrade label, was particularly strong in the 
Netherlands. As a consequence, a significant portion of Dutch coffee drinkers became 
well-informed and concerned about the imbalance of power between multinational 
roasters and small farmers in several producing countries.  
 Rising consumer awareness and pressure from social movements in the 
Netherlands induced search processes that smaller Dutch roasters engaged in in the 1970s 
and 1980s, including experiments with ‘fairly traded’ coffee which eventually helped 
establish the label Fairtrade. The Dutch coffee market was dominated by Douwe Egberts, 
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which still takes a market share of over 50 % (see also Table 4). The remaining market 
share was divided among many smaller roasters, some of whom had direct contacts with 
farmers in producing countries. As a consequence, distance between consumption and 
production was much smaller than is the case with many large mainstream buyers (see 
also Princen et al., 2002). Their more integrated supply chains and desire to differentiate 
themselves from mainstream roasters promoted early experiments with fairly traded 
coffee. In particular, three of the smaller roasters, e.g. Peeze, started to collaborate to 
develop a system that would give a fairer price to farmers. The development of the Max 
Havelaar standard has been described extensively elsewhere (Roozen & Van der Hoff, 
2001). We focus on complementary developments involving Peeze, a small firm whose 
story provides a compelling illustration of the context factors that eventually culminated 
in the creation of the Fairtrade standard as well as for organic coffee.  
In the 1980s, Peeze along with other small Dutch roasters sought to implement a 
strategic vision of integrating improvements on quality, environment, and labor aspects 
through innovations in the firm’s activities. From the owner’s view, this required 
collaboration and control of all steps in the supply chain, as well as with other actors.  
“Sustainable entrepreneurship has everything to do with what you do yourself. 
Quality, labor conditions, and the environment. That is why we prefer to keep the 
whole product life cycle under control. [The product life cycle] consists of many 
stages, that eventually lead to sustainability, and for this reason we don’t want to 
miss out on any one of them.” (Owner of Peeze) 
While for some firms a fair price was the central issue, for Peeze the combination of 
social and ecological aspects was crucial: Peeze was concerned that soil would be 
destroyed if ecological aspects were neglected which would in the long run destroy the 
farmers’ means of subsistence. Over a number of years, Peeze worked in projects with 
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farmers in Mexico to teach them organic growing methods based on knowledge provided 
by an agricultural university that was also involved. This promoted a joint learning 
process which resulted in sustainable local practices.  
 In order to develop a reliable supply of sustainable coffee, Peeze needed to 
achieve two things. First, it had to expand the number of farmers that could fulfill this 
demand. For this, projects in other countries were launched, promoting a resource 
network and process of learning among participants, as in each country conditions and 
cultural traditions are different. Secondly, a monitoring system needed to be developed 
that would ensure that farmers continue to follow guidelines, and that would enable 
communication of these practices in European markets. As a result, Peeze engaged in the 
development of standards such as Max Havelaar and EKO. The practices developed in 
the resource networks of Peeze provided a basis for these standards. Peeze therefore 
actively shaped the definition of sustainability as laid down in these standards.  
 The example of Fairtrade shows how regionally embedded movements – here: the 
solidarity movement in the Netherlands; regional economic conditions and structures – 
here: the importance of small roasters in the Netherlands; and global supplier relations – 
here: direct supply relations between Dutch roasters and farmers in Latin America – 
provided the ground for experimental search processes promoting the establishment of 
one of the most important sustainability standards today.  
 
The emergence of Utz Certified  
Unlike Fairtrade, which was driven by social movement activists and small alternative 
trade organizations (sometimes backed by Catholic or Protestant development agencies), 
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the Utz Kapeh (later: Utz Certified) standard originated from initiatives taken by Dutch 
firms. Like in the case of Fairtrade, a small roaster firm played a significant role in 
promoting standards development. At a time when Fairtrade was already established, 
targeting a growing segment of informed Dutch consumers, the development of Utz 
Certified was driven by firm-level search processes targeting mainstream coffee supply 
and consumption. More concretely, Utz Certified resulted from a collaboration between 
the Ahold Coffee Company (ACC) with a Guatemalan coffee supplier. 
ACC established itself as an independent company from its former owner, the 
large Dutch retailer Ahold. ACC originally was part of a string of firms that supplied 
retail stores, but two managers bought the firm in 2000. A first requirement was to 
develop a customer base independent from Ahold, and it was decided that the market for 
sustainable coffee would be the major focus. Similar to other small Dutch roasters, ACC 
worked already for a longer time with a sourcing strategy that eliminated intermediate 
traders, buying directly from plantations and cooperatives. The direct relationship was 
helpful in several ways: it allowed the possibility to influence producers directly to 
improve quality, and as traders were eliminated, a higher price could be paid. 
 The Max Havelaar standard already provided a template for sustainable practices, 
However, in the mid 1990s, Max Havelaar took a market share of only 3 % in the 
Netherlands. Given this situation, ACC managers felt the need to better access the 
mainstream market for their company to be viable. They analyzed the Max Havelaar 
model to see what needed to be changed to make this possible.  
“[We] looked carefully at the Max Havelaar model. We agreed with their vision, 
but the resulting market share was too low. We needed to capture the mainstream 
market. […] Our company needed to define sustainable coffee in a competitive 
way.” (Owner ACC)  
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Essentially, the Utz Certified standard that eventually was developed can be characterized 
as increasing the transparency of the mainstream market, rather than developing an 
alternative niche market. For example Utz does not guarantee a price premium, but rather 
encourages farmers and buyers to negotiate a price in which increased quality is rewarded 
with a higher price. Farmers also commit to continuous improvement. Criteria were based 
on existing ones from GAP and ILO, and refined with a pro-active farmer in Guatemala. 
Striving for traceability, ACC helped increase market transparency, allowing farmers to 
see what is paid for coffee to other farmers by other roasters. 
 In sum, the development of Utz Certified underscores the importance of regional 
economic dynamics and global structures in standards development. Unlike in the case of 
Fairtrade, search processes leading to the Utz standard took off in a situation where a 
growing segment of niche consumers was already being targeted by a sustainability label. 
However, rather than establishing a monopoly for sustainable coffee production, 
Fairtrade opened a space, in the Dutch roasters’ market initially, for new sustainability 
initiatives targeting different consumer segments, hence providing an opportunity for Utz 
Certified to develop. The emergence of Utz Certified vis-à-vis the established standard 
Fairtrade is, therefore, an example of standards variation in the same economic and 
institutional context. In the case of Utz, the main source of variation was not the regional 
context, but an emerging opportunity structure within this context as a result of the 
existence – and positioning – of Fairtrade. In other words, Utz as a standard co-evolved 
with Fairtrade in a context providing the space for multiple standard emergence.   
  
The emergence of 4C 
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The Common Code for the Coffee Community (4C) is a relatively new standard 
(formally established in 2007). It targets mainstream coffee production, e.g. by abolishing 
worst social and environmental practices and by encouraging more sustainable practices 
among 4C certified firms over time. Unlike Fairtrade and Utz Certified, 4C originated 
from initiatives rooted in the German institutional context of development cooperation. 
4C was mainly driven by MNCs, such as Jacobs (now part of Kraft Foods) and Nestle, 
most of whom are based in Germany or German-speaking countries, and the German 
Development Agency GTZ who took the role as a project entrepreneur, network agent 
and process facilitator and moderator (Manning & von Hagen, 2010). 
Since the 1970s, Germany has been an important donor and partner for 
development projects in Third-World countries. The development budget is administered 
by the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) which 
carries out development projects with partner countries through state-owned development 
agencies, such as the German Agency for Technical Development Cooperation (GTZ). In 
order to mobilize resources for economic development projects, the BMZ launched the 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) program in 2001 through which private firms could 
become development partners for projects of shared interest. Many PPP projects target 
sustainable working and production practices in developing countries. Since the PPP 
program was launched, the GTZ has initiated more than 1,000 development projects in 
collaboration with private firms from Germany and abroad (GIZ, 2011).  
The PPP program provided an opportunity for firms interested in experimenting 
with sustainable production practices, partially in response to rising consumer awareness 
and NGO pressure. Through PPP, private firms could utilize the financial and operational 
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support as well as the contact network of development agencies, such as the GTZ, to 
implement projects in collaboration with local authorities. One example is the project 
‘coffee organico’ where the GTZ collaborated with Jacobs (later owned by Kraft Foods) 
in Peru. In line with development policies at that time, the GTZ and the Peruvian 
government targeted sustainable coffee practices in Peru, to raise coffee quality, provide 
better opportunities for farmers and establish a supplier market for large roasters. Kraft, 
in turn, was interested in capturing market share, stabilizing supply from Peru and raising 
mainstream coffee quality. To implement new quality standards in Peru, Kraft utilized the 
GTZ as a legitimate public partner:  
“This is only possible with a local partner, with an organization present on the 
ground […] with the necessary contacts to the administration, to officials, to the 
coffee chamber and to the coffee Junta. An organization like the GTZ brings 
along all the things which I would have a hard time figuring out for myself. [...] 
Finally, I learned that in the coffee sector – like in other fields – the GTZ has 
more know-how and competence than other organizations.” (Kraft manager) 
“It is important for Kraft to involve the GTZ. You [as a private corporation] 
cannot do it on your own. You have to work with the GTZ as an institution, 
because otherwise you lack credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the Peruvian 
Government. You need credibility to actually build up willingness on the 
government side to engage in changing legislature.” (GTZ manager)  
Over time, the GTZ has implemented a number of local development projects in different 
regions of the world addressing sustainable coffee production in collaboration with 
private partners, including Kraft Foods, Nestle and Sarah Lee (see for an overview 
Manning & von Hagen, 2010). These local projects formed the basis for a more global 
initiative – the 4C initiative in 2001/2. In order not to ‘reinvent the wheel’, participants of 
the global 4C initiative built on elements of both Fairtrade, Utz Kapeh (later: Utz 
Certified) and other initiatives. At the same time, 4C initiators targeted potential adopters 
neglected by existing standards initiatives:  
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“Through the experiences with different players, and in discussions with Kraft, 
Neumann, and Sara Lee, we had this idea: Why not try something big, something 
on a higher level with a structural impact, which is pre-competitive and includes 
all actors of the value chain, not just the private sector, producers or civil society. 
This is how a common vision, a common innovation evolved.” (GTZ 4C Project 
Coordinator) 
“[First we made] an assessment and inventory of what already was out there, so 
rather than reinvent the wheel, we took a lot of what already existed: from the 
private company initiatives, from Rainforest Alliance, from Utz Kapeh, from 
Fairtrade….” (Coffee industry representative). 
“The lion’s share, that was when 4C appeared on the stage, 95% percent of the 
market was not even certifiable […] From our perspective it is not about that all 
producers should be verified according to 4C, but we want to focus on our target 
group – unorganized small producers and other actors in the chain.” (4C 
representative) 
4C can therefore be seen as a result of particular institutional opportunities and 
relationships in the German context, on the one hand, and opportunity structures within 
an already existing space for sustainability standards, on the other hand. The example of 
4C underlines the importance of these sources of variation: institutional conditions in a 
regional context, and market opportunities influencing decision-making of participating 
agents, in particular MNCs. For 4C, in particular, already existing standards – including 
Fairtrade and Utz Kapeh/Certified – influenced the initial positioning of 4C, further 
illustrating the co-evolving dynamics of standards variation.  
Resulting opportunities, however, were embedded in a particular institutional 
context at a time when coffee roasters, like Kraft Foods, were searching for affordable 
ways of addressing sustainability demands as well as the need for improved mainstream 
coffee quality. Institutional relations between the GTZ and local authorities in developing 
countries as well as supplier relations between European roasters and local firms further 
provided the basis for local experiments with sustainable production practices paving the 
way for this global standard (Manning & von Hagen, 2010). Importantly, development 
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agencies such as GTZ are thereby increasingly influenced also by European and UN 
development policies and agendas. For example, involving firms within public private 
partnerships has become a legitimate approach to international development (Von Moltke, 
2002). Also, the concept of ‘sustainability’ adopted by the GTZ in PPP projects with 
German and European partner firms has been influenced by the international 
development discourse. The triple bottom line of sustainability as ‘social equity’, 
‘environmental quality’ and ‘economic prosperity’ has thereby established a dominant 
benchmark position for development projects focusing on sustainability.  
Table 2 summarizes and compares key features of the development of the three 
standards, focusing in particular on initiating parties and sources of variation. Next, we 
discuss how these and other standards have co-evolved and been adopted over time, and 
how co-evolution and adoption have been influenced by transmission mechanisms and 
selection regimes, thereby focusing on key stakeholders involved.  
------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 
-------------------------- 
 
STANDARDS TRANSMISSION AND SELECTION: BUYER PREFERENCES, 
PRODUCER STRUCTURES, AND NATIONAL INTERMEDIARIES 
The adoption rate of private sustainability standards, including Fairtrade, Utz Certified, 
and 4C, has increased continuously year by year (see Figure 2). At a closer look, 
however, standards initiatives have not penetrated the global coffee value chain to the 
same extent. Looking at producer countries, Fairtrade certification has been adopted 
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particularly by producers in Colombia, followed by Brazil and Indonesia; Vietnamese 
coffee, by contrast, has not been certified at all (see Figure 3). UTZ Certified has been 
adopted primarily by Brazilian farmers and cooperatives, followed by Vietnamese and 
Colombian (see Figure 3). As of 2009, this distribution of adoption largely reflects the 
global distribution of coffee production (see Figure 1). 4C finally has been adopted 
primarily by producers in Colombia, followed by Vietnam and Brazil (see Figure 3). 
However, statistics from the Coffee Barometer 2009 further suggest that standards differ 
by the percentage of certified coffee actually purchased on the market: In 2008, 48% of 
Fairtrade certified coffee was actually purchased; 25% of UTZ certified coffee was 
purchased, and 10% of 4C certified coffee was purchased (TCC, 2009). 
------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 3 
-------------------------- 
From a co-evolutionary point of view, the different rate of adoption of particular 
standards by producers can be explained by certain transmission and selection 
mechanisms along the global value chain which we analyze in more detail next. As we 
will show, national context conditions, again, play a key role here. 
 
Buyer preferences  
Previous research has indicated that powerful buyers in global value chains have a strong 
influence on the adoption of sustainability standards, and that buyers favor standards that 
are marketable and secure margins (e.g. Levy, 2008). Less understood are reasons why 
buyers are quite heterogeneous in terms of their willingness to purchase certified coffee 
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and their preference for particular standards. Starbucks, for example, has been at the 
forefront of purchasing certified coffee from its suppliers, thereby favoring their own 
standard C.A.F.E., but also increasingly Fairtrade and Organic (see Table 3). In 2008, 
77% of their purchased coffee was certified; and by 2015, 100% certification is planned. 
Other major roasters have purchased much less certified coffee. Notably, SaraLee 
purchased 4.5% certified coffee in 2008, primarily UTZ certified. Tchibo purchased 6.2% 
certified coffee in 2008, partially Rainforest Alliance, Fairtrade and Organic, partially 4C. 
Kraft purchased 4.1% certified, mostly Rainforest Alliance (see Table 3). How can these 
differences be explained? And to what extent do different buyer preferences impact rate 
of adoption in different producing regions? 
------------------------- 
INSERT TABLES 3, 4 
-------------------------- 
On the one hand, roasters typically target particular consumer markets which differ in 
terms of the acceptance and penetration of standards. In other words, consumer 
preferences (and education) in combination with the marketing strategies and positioning 
of buyers constitute an important selection mechanism. Table 4 shows how much 
certified coffee was consumed in major consuming countries in Europe in 2007. 
Germany, Italy, and Netherlands are among the most important consumer markets. The 
Netherlands, the highest per capita coffee country in Europe, have had the greatest 
penetration of certification: 25% of consumed coffee in 2007 was certified. As noted 
earlier, the biggest roaster in the Netherlands – SaraLee – mainly purchases and sells Utz 
certified coffee. By comparison, Utz is less prominent in Germany and UK. In Germany, 
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the biggest European coffee market (22% market share), organic has been a popular 
standard for many years. Not by chance, therefore, Tchibo, one of the largest German 
roasters, has purchased a considerable percentage of organic certified coffee. Similar 
patterns can be seen across Europe, as a former consultant for Nespresso, explains:  
“It is about market dynamics, what the company believes in, what they feel more 
comfortable who they want to talk to – what is their market... Starbucks they have 
a huge market in the UK. In the UK Fairtrade is what is important, in Germany it 
is organic. In Holland it is both organic and Utz Certified. Each country has its 
specific dynamics. So in the UK, if you are not Fairtrade then you are unfair. So 
Starbucks had a lot of pressure to get Fairtrade certification. So obviously after 
they did it for the UK, it was then the next step to take it into other countries.”  
On the other hand, roasters and consuming countries have typically established preferred 
supplier relationships in particular producing regions. For example, a large share of 
coffee consumed in the UK is purchased from Colombia (see Table 4). UK coffee 
consumers, e.g. Starbucks and Nestle coffee buyers, value Colombian coffee as well as 
the Fairtrade label, more than for example consumers in Germany. Not by chance, 
therefore, Colombia has the highest penetration of Fairtrade certification among all 
producing countries (see Figure 3). As another example, Douwe Egbert’s commitment to 
purchasing Utz Certified coffee from suppliers in Brazil has to do with high demand for 
Brazilian coffee in Holland and, again, the acceptance of standards in general, and the 
Utz standard in particular among Dutch coffee drinkers (see Table 4). Brazil has the 
highest share in terms of Utz certified coffee volume worldwide (Figure 3). In sum, 
roasters, who target particular consumer markets, serve as important transmitters of 
standards in particular producing countries. They do so by setting certification 
requirements for farmers and by getting involved in farmer’s training programs, partly in 
collaboration with standard organizations and development agencies. At the same time, 
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buyer preferences in consuming countries become an important selection mechanism in 
terms of the adoption of standards in producing countries.  
 
Producer structures  
Another important factor in the adoption of standards practices are organizational forms 
and structures of producers. In particular, the size of farms and producer organizations 
matter in terms of the extent to which particular standards get adopted. As Table 1 shows, 
standards organizations have typically targeted different types of producers: Fairtrade, for 
example, has mainly targeted small farms organized in cooperatives, whereas Utz 
Certified has specialized in medium-sized and large estates. This may explain in part why 
Fairtrade has been adopted in countries such as Mexico, where a large number of 
smallholders and cooperatives exist, whereas the standard has been less dominant in 
Brazil, where many farms are midsize or large. The role of size of producers is also 
perceived by standards expert as a major reason for the difference in rate of adoption 
across different producer regions. A standards representative explains: 
“For Fairtrade, the most important thing is that they (producers) are small 
farmers, and they need to be organized in cooperatives. Countries with a lot of 
smallholders and cooperatives are for example Columbia, Peru. Farmers don’t 
have to do an awful lot to get certified – practices can be bad, but farmers need to 
be organized in a group.”  
 
Producer structures have therefore served as an important selection mechanism for 
standards in particular regions. Related to this, many smallholder cooperatives and larger 
farms have started to adopt multiple standards in order to meet requirements of different 
product lines of the same roaster or of multiple potential roasters, who they sell to 
directly or, more likely, through a trader or exporting agent. As a result, many producers 
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have faced increasing certification costs, which has sparked discussions on the 
‘inefficiencies’ of having a multiplicity of only partially similar standards (see also 
Reinecke et al., 2010). This, in turn, has led to an increasing trend towards mutual 
standards endorsement, e.g. between Rainforest Alliance and the baseline standard 4C, as 
well as increasing compatibility between different modules of standards certification and 
training. From a co-evolutionary perspective, therefore, the embeddedness of many 
suppliers in multiple coffee value chains has generated selection pressure promoting 
common standards criteria, training and certification practices. 
 
National Intermediaries  
Recent studies have increasingly paid attention to certain institutional intermediaries who 
have impacted not only the ways in which standards practices are transmitted, but also 
which criteria standards need to meet in order to be legitimate. In the context of coffee, 
the example of ISEAL is perhaps most prominent. This meta-organization was set up to 
harmonize standards offerings and to ‘regulate the standards market’ (see in more detail 
Reinecke et al., 2010). However, a number of other intermediaries have played an 
important role in standards development and adoption, in particular at the national level, 
which have not been well understood.  
 One important intermediary at the national level are national coffee associations, 
such as the National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia, or the Vietnam Coffee 
and Cocoa Association (Vicofa). The latter became founding member of the 4C 
Association after having participated in a number of public private partnership projects in 
Vietnam involving the GTZ, Neumann Group, Sara Lee, Kraft and other partners (see in 
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more detail, Manning & von Hagen, 2010). Local representative organizations, such as 
Vicofa, are important partners for development projects involving government agencies, 
such as GTZ. Today, Vicofa plays an important role in implementing the 4C standard in 
Vietnam and also in helping standard organizations, such as 4C, coordinate local projects 
and programs. 4C recently opened a Vietnam office to further support these joint 
activities. Not least because of these institutional structures, Vietnam has become one of 
the major countries for 4C standard adoption. Importantly, unlike intergovernmental 
agreements, such as ICA, which used to regulate coffee production and exports nation-
wide, voluntary standards remain subject to adoption decisions of particular producers, 
despite institutional support from national coffee association. However, the latter, like in 
the case of Vietnam, may serve as ‘quasi-representatives’ of states in multi-stakeholder 
processes of standards development and implementation. 
 Another increasingly important intermediary and ‘transmitter’ of standards are 
traders or exporters within particular producing countries. Interviews with industry 
observers suggest that the training of farmers that is needed in order for them to get 
certified is often delegated to traders. Traders bundle expertise and also further promote 
standards compatibility, e.g. in terms of trainings modules. On behalf of buyers, and in 
coordination with locally represented standards organizations, traders in different 
countries have started hiring specialized agronomists who have been put in charge of 
training and other implementation programs. A standards representative explains: 
“And we observe, and that is very encouraging, that many of the trading houses 
actually build up agronomy capacity at the field level, and we have been training 
[…] some of the largest coffee traders in the world who also trade cocoa and lots 
of other things, and they start employing agronomists because they have demand 
for […] certified coffee, and we train their agronomist. So we team up, it’s kind of 
train the trainers. And we agree this is a fundamental change in the industry, and 
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that is extremely exciting, and I would like to say, it is probably the only way that 
such a massive change could happen.”  
 
As a consequence, traders have not only become important transmitters of sustainability 
standards on behalf of global clients, thereby further driving the co-evolution and mutual 
adjustment of standards implementation practices in particular countries (e.g. 4C and 
Rainforest Alliance, or Fairtrade and Organic), but they have also strengthened their 
position in global value chains vis-à-vis regionally dispersed producers, and sometimes 
multiple clients. Paradoxically, therefore, the initial objective of empowering farmers, as 
shared by some standards organizations (e.g. Fairtrade), has been partially undermined by 
perceived ‘efficiencies’ of implementing standards regimes through traders, who may 
further dictate the terms by which farmers can sell their products to the global market. It 
will be important in future research to further investigate how the trader’s positioning as a 
result of these practices has changed vis-à-vis global buyers, and how this is impacting 
the distribution of power and control within global value chains. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND 
POLICY-MAKING 
 
Global coffee chains display a remarkable evolution in terms of the move towards more 
sustainable modes of production and sourcing. This trend has been promoted by a number 
of sustainability standards initiatives which today compete for adoption and legitimacy 
(Kolk, 2005; Muradian & Pelupessy, 2005; Reinecke et al., 2010). As pointed out in 
previous studies (e.g. Reinecke et al., 2010), sustainability initiatives have not led to any 
single standards solution; rather, multiple standards have co-created a space for their 
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mutual co-existence. Taking a co-evolutionary perspective, we have sought to shed more 
light on drivers of standards emergence and co-existence, with particular emphasis on the 
role of national contexts in this process. Using the coffee industry as an example, and 
focusing on the standards Fairtrade, Utz Certified and the Common Code for the Coffee 
Community (4C), we addressed the following question: How has the co-evolution of 
sustainability standards been promoted and affected by the embeddedness of key 
stakeholders within particular national contexts? 
 Unlike many scholars who have argued that the development and effective 
implementation of voluntary sustainability standards is primarily affected by global 
economic structures, in particular global value chains, we show that the anchoring of key 
stakeholders, such as MNC roasters, producers, and development agencies, within certain 
national economic and institutional contexts has played an equally important role. In 
other words: national contexts matter! 
 In particular, we have examined sources of standards variation, and mechanisms 
of standards transmission and selection, focusing on the interplay of national context 
conditions and global economic structures, and the embeddedness of key stakeholders in 
these contexts and structures. Table 5 summarizes how key value chain stakeholders – 
buyers, producers, and intermediaries – are embedded in national contexts, and how they 
affect processes of standards variation, transmission and selection. 
------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 
-------------------------- 
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We have shown that sustainability standards have been typically initiated in certain 
consuming countries by certain stakeholder constellations, e.g. development agencies, 
NGOs and roasters. Therefore, some key sources of standards variation can be found in 
the national contexts within which these stakeholders operate and interact. Standards 
have typically resulted from search processes of key stakeholders facing certain market 
opportunity structures (e.g. Kraft anticipating demand for organic coffee in Germany) 
and institutional conditions in this country (e.g. funding for public private partnership 
projects addressing sustainability objectives; availability of competent project partners, 
such as development agencies; see Table 1). Also, as multiple standards enter the market 
over time, e.g. Fairtrade and Utz Certified in the Dutch market, they co-evolve from the 
very beginning, as they position themselves towards each other, occupy different market 
segments, and co-create a legitimate space for multiple standards to co-exist (see also 
Reinecke et al., 2010). Importantly, standards variation within this emerging space is 
thereby mainly driven by founding conditions in consuming countries, whereas producers 
typically have little interest in standards variation/multiplicity. 
 With regard to standards transmission and selection, producing countries with 
their economic and institutional structures become more critical. Differences in these 
structures as well as in economic relations with buyers and consuming countries explain 
to a large extent why, to this day, producing countries vary greatly in their rate of 
standards adoption. First, transmission and selection within producer countries are 
strongly influenced by preferred certifications and supplier relations of leading buyers, 
who, in turn, anticipate and respond to demand of certified coffee in their target consumer 
market (see also Tables 4, 5). Second, producer structures, e.g. many smallholders vs. 
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larger farms, serve as selection mechanisms in terms of types of standards adopted in a 
particular country, e.g. standards addressing smallholders (Fairtrade) vs. larger estates 
(Utz Certified). Producers further apply considerable selection pressure as they face 
difficulties adopting multiple certifications for different buyers, which has led recently to 
an increasing compatibility of standards offerings (see also Reinecke et al., 2010). Third, 
certain institutional and business intermediaries in producer countries may play a critical 
role in particular as standards transmitters. We particularly looked at national producer 
associations who help coordinate implementation efforts, and also participate in standards 
development. In addition, national exporters/traders have become important transmitters 
of standards practices on behalf of clients by employing agronomists to train farmers and 
to oversee the implementation/certification process. 
 Our findings have important implications for future research on sustainability 
standards. First of all, we suggest that a co-evolutionary field perspective, focusing on 
sources of variation, and mechanisms of transmission and selection of standards, provides 
a useful lens to better understand the dynamics of standards development (see also Boons, 
2009). Rather than treating standards and standards setters as atomistic entities competing 
for acceptance and adoption, we looked at how standards have co-evolved as a result of 
ongoing interactions between key stakeholders in the field: standards setters, MNCs, 
producers, NGOs, government agencies, and intermediaries (see also Wijen & Ansari, 
2007; Fransen & Kolk, 2007; Manning & von Hagen, 2010).  
 Second, we demonstrated that national conditions matter in this process. While 
global economic structures and exchanges, e.g. between powerful commodity buyers and 
less powerful suppliers along global value chains (see e.g. MacDonald, 2007; Levy, 
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2008), are certainly important, such a view often ignores the heterogeneity of firms – be 
it buyers, producers, or intermediaries – in their decisions to adopt or push for particular 
standards at particular points in time. One important explanatory factor are the national 
economic and institutional contexts within which these players are embedded, and the 
ways these contexts interlink with global economic structures. In particular, founding 
conditions of particular standards can be very context-specific, and they explain in part 
the proliferation of multiple, partially similar standards. Equally, adoption conditions 
typically differ by country, depending on economic structures, trade relationships with 
global buyers, and institutional conditions. Further research is needed to better 
understand how the anchorage of global value chain actors within particular national 
contexts affects their involvement in sustainability initiatives and the likelihood of 
particular standards to be adopted regionally or globally. 
For policy-makers, this study brings the insight that a situation in which multiple 
standards co-exist is not necessarily problematic, as long as the diversity of standards 
allows different countries to participate in this process. One reason for this is that some 
degree of ‘competition for adoption’ as well as the development of different standards 
types, e.g. addressing particular producer needs, helps create feedback loops which can 
be central for effective development efforts (see also Manning & Von Hagen, 2010; for a 
general discussion Easterly, 2006). At the same time, our study shows that governments 
and governmental agencies remain very important players in promoting private standards 
regimes. The case of 4C, in particular, demonstrated that government agencies can play a 
key role as facilitators and moderators of multi-stakeholder processes, involving MNCs, 
local institutions and farmers (see also Manning & von Hagen, 2010). In so far, nation-
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states are not ‘dead’ when it comes to influencing transnational governance efforts. 
Rather, governments play an important role in influencing and giving legitimacy to 
national institutions, e.g. development agencies, but also to industry associations, who 
may become important players in standard development and adoption. We invite future 
research to more systematically address the inter-linkage between ‘private governance’ 
and governmental as well as intergovernmental regulation, in promoting sustainability 
and in regulating other transnational affairs.  
 Furthermore, we invite future research to go beyond the scope of this study. First, 
whereas most studies on sustainability along the global value chain, including ours, have 
focused on sustainable growing and harvesting practices, more research is needed on 
sustainability initiatives addressing roasting and consumption (see also Princen et al., 
2002) – and also explaining the difference in penetration of ‘sustainable practices’ at 
different stages of the value chain. Second, we would welcome studies looking at 
particular marketing strategies of standards organizations and their effect on adoption. 
Third, we need more systematic studies on the actual impact of standards certification on 
local communities, growing practices and environmental sustainability (see also 
Giovannucci & Villalobos, 2007; Bolwig et al., 2008; Kilian et al., 2006). Most evidence 
on impact is rather anecdotal. Notably, a number of studies have listed a number of 
challenges associated with standards adoption, including the disadvantaged position of 
small farmers and the lack of needed education (Bacon, 2005). In this regard, is standards 
multiplicity vis-à-vis a unified solution a facilitator – or a constraint – of adoption and 
‘positive spillover effects’ on the environment and different actor groups?  
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 Future research needs to also address some of the limitations of this study. First of 
all, our findings are entirely based on the coffee industry. Future research should compare 
coffee to other sectors, such as cocoa, tea and palm oil, in terms of the development and 
adoption of multiple standards (see e.g. TCC, 2010). This could also include a thorough 
analysis of the role of standards organizations, e.g. Fairtrade, and Utz Certified, as well as 
of multi-brand food producers, e.g. Nestle and Kraft, in bridging global value chains. 
Second, our study says little about internal decision-making processes within producer 
organizations or buyers. It will be crucial for a better understanding of co-evolutionary 
processes in the context of sustainability standards adoption to capture how firms differ 
in their ability and willingness to adopt standards or to promote standards adoption in 
their supplier network. Third, our study is empirical biased towards the viewpoint of 
institutions from developed countries, not least because we lacked interview access to 
players in producing countries. Future research needs to balance perspectives better by 
including key stakeholders to a similar extent.  
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Figure 1: Distribution of world coffee production (source: ICO 2009) 
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Figure 2: Adoption of sustainability standards over time (Multiple sources)1 
 
 
                                                 
1 Data compiled from: AC (2007), 4C (2009), Daviron & Ponte (2005), Giovannucci (2001), Giovannucci & Potts 
(2008), Giovannucci et al., (2008), Lazaro (2008), Potts (2007), Rainforest Alliance (2008), Raynolds et al. (2004), 
Starbucks (2007), TCARC (2009), USAID & Rainforest Alliance (2007), UTZ Certified (2008) 
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Figure 3: Adoption of certifications by country (% of total certified volume, sources: 
2009 Annual Reports of Fairtrade, Utz Certified, and 4C*)  
 
* Percentage numbers for 4C coffee from Indonesia, Peru, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua and India are 
estimates (total: 12% from Latin America excl. Colombia and Brazil; 1% from Southeast Asia excl. 
Vietnam) 
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 Fairtrade Rainforest 
Alliance 
Utz Certified 
(formerly: 
Utz Kapeh) 
Starbucks 
C.A.F.E. 
Practices 
4C 
Association 
Organic 
Main 
Objective 
Improve 
position of 
farmers in 
trade with a 
guaranteed 
minimum 
price as 
main 
attribute. 
Focus on 
developmen
t/poverty 
alleviation. 
Improve 
environmenta
l and social 
conditions in 
tropical 
agriculture. 
Focus on 
biodiversity 
Achieve 
sustainable 
supply 
chains, 
meeting 
needs of 
farmers, 
industry and 
consumers. 
Good social 
and 
environmen
tal 
performanc
e 
minimizing 
environmen
tal impact, 
improving 
local 
communitie
s. 
Baseline 
standard to 
improve 
situation for 
producers, 
workers, rural 
communities, 
trade & 
industry, 
consumers 
and the 
environment. 
Develop 
standards for 
organic 
agriculture 
and facilitate 
its adoption. 
Unite the 
organic 
movement 
worldwide. 
Sales of 
compliant 
coffee (2009) 
About  
91 573 MT 
About  
87 583 MT 
About  
82 058 MT 
About  
135 624 MT 
About  
29 547 MT 
About  
101 583 MT 
Target 
Group 
Small 
farmers 
organized in 
cooperative
s 
Big and 
medium sized 
estates 
Big and 
medium sized 
estates 
High-
quality 
coffee 
growers 
Coffee 
producers of 
all sizes 
Coffee 
producers of 
all sizes 
Standard 
Launch 
1988 1995 1997 1995 2004/2007 1972 
Initiator Social 
Movement/ 
NGO 
Social 
Movement/ 
NGO 
Firm (Ahold 
Coffee 
company) in 
cooperation 
with 
Guatemalan 
coffee 
supplier  
Firm 
(Starbucks) 
Government/ 
Industry 
 
Social 
Movement/ 
NGO 
Initiated in Netherlands
/Mexico 
USA Netherlands USA Germany Germany 
 
 
 
Table 1: Comparison of Coffee Sustainability Standards (Sources: websites of standards 
organizations; annual reports) 
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 Max Havelaar/ 
Fairtrade 
Utz Kapeh / 
Certified 
Common Code for 
the Coffee 
Community (4C) 
Initiating 
organizations 
Peeze, Simon 
Levelt, Nico Roozen 
ACC GTZ – German 
development 
agency, Kraft and 
other MNCs 
Key search 
processes of key 
stakeholders (e.g. 
roaster MNCs) 
Search for ways to 
promote fairness in 
global economy / 
values-based coffee 
supply  
Distinguishing from 
Max Havelaar /  
Collaboration with 
farmers 
Search for organic 
labeling methods / 
qualification of 
farmers in different 
contexts 
Facilitating 
economic and 
institutional 
conditions in 
consumer 
countries 
Critical consumers 
in Dutch market / 
many smaller 
roasters with direct 
supplier relations 
Fairtrade as niche 
market established; 
perceived 
opportunity for 
more mainstream 
certified coffee 
Anticipated demand 
for organic coffee; 
Public Private 
Partnership 
program; aid 
partnerships with 
producer countries 
Facilitating 
conditions in 
producer countries 
Existing contacts 
with farmers in 
Mexico 
Existing contacts / 
direct supply 
relations with local 
farmers 
Local development 
projects with key 
private partners in 
Latin America 
 
 
Table 2: Sources of Standards Variation Comparing Fairtrade, UTZ, and 4C 
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Coffee 
roaster 
Total volume 
purchased in 
2008 
Certified coffee % certified 
coffee in 2008 
Nestle 780,000 t 13,000 t AAA Nespresso, 2,000 t Fairtrade, 
4,000 t 4C 
2.7% 
Kraft 740,000 t 29,500 Rainforest Alliance, 1,000 t 4C 4.1 % 
SaraLee 450,000 t 20,000 t Utz Certified, 400 t 4C 4.5 % 
Smucker’s 280,000 t 1,500 t Rainforest Alliance / Fairtrade / 
Organic 
0.5 % 
Starbucks 175,000 t 120,500 t C.A.F.E., 9,000 t Fairtrade 
4,500 t Organic 
76.5 % (100% 
planned by 2015) 
Tchibo 170,000 t 5,500 t Rainforest Alliance / Fairtrade / 
Organic, 5,000 t 4C 
6.2 % (25% 
planned by 2015) 
 
Table 3: Certified Coffee Purchased by Largest Coffee Roasters (Source: TCC, 2009) 
 
 
Country (vol 
consumption, 
2007) 
Leading suppliers 
(from developing 
countries) 
Major roasters (market 
share) 
% Certified coffee in 
2008 
Germany 
(512,000 t / 
22% market 
share in 
Europe) 
Brazil (28%) 
Vietnam (13%), 
Colombia (8.6%), 
Peru (7.4%), 
Indonesia (7.4%), 
Honduras (6.5%) 
80 % market share for five 
roasters: Kraft&Tchibo (~ 
48%), Melitta (~12%), 
Dalmayr (~10%), Aldi 
(~10%). Growing 
importance of coffee shops 
5% certified (2% 
organic); 4C certified 
coffee also available, but 
marginal 
Italy  
(340,000 t / 
14% market 
share) 
Brazil (37%), 
Vietnam (15%), 
India (10%), 
Colombia (6.3%) 
Lavazza (50% market 
share), followed by Illy and 
local roasters 
<1% (Lavazza buys 
Rainforest Alliance 
certified coffee, but only 
sells it in UK) 
Netherlands 
(113,580 t / 
highest per 
capita 
consumption) 
Brazil (27%), 
Vietnam (11%), 
Colombia (8.8%), 
Guatemala (7.5%) 
Sara Lee Douwe Egberts 
(50% market share); Ahold, 
Drie Mollen Holding 
25% (long tradition of 
certified, e.g. Fairtrade, 
coffee); 40% of Douwe 
Egberts, certified coffee 
sold in NL 
UK 
(184,000 t / 
7.7% market 
share in 
Europe) 
Colombia (24%), 
Brazil (16%), 
Vietnam (16%), 
Indonesia (10%) 
Nestlé (about 50% market 
share); Kraft Foods (about 
20%). Coffee shops, such 
as Starbucks, Costa Coffee, 
Caffè Nero (15% annual 
growth since 2000). 
About 20 % of total 
coffee sales is certified 
Fairtrade (34,383 t); 
Coffee often double 
certified 
Fairtrade/organic. Utz 
plays a minor role. 
 
Table 4: Consumption of Certified Coffee in Different Countries (Source: TCC, 2009; 
Mintel UK coffee report, 2010; FAO, 2009; CBI, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d) 
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 Commodity Buyers  Commodity 
Producers  
Intermediaries 
(e.g. development 
agencies, producer 
associations, 
traders) 
Embeddedness in 
global value chains 
and national 
contexts 
Lead actors in 
GVCs; embedded in 
/ serving Western 
consumer markets / 
exposed to cultures 
and institutions in 
consuming countries 
Globally dispersed 
with little individual 
power; more or less 
organized, and 
embedded in 
economic structures 
of producer 
countries  
Traders link 
producing countries 
to world markets; 
Associations 
represent producers 
and maintain links 
with development 
agencies  
Role in standards 
emergence / 
variation 
Co-develop 
standards / search 
for new labels 
targeting more or 
less specific 
consumer markets 
Little ‘active’ role; 
typically no interest 
in promoting 
standards variation;  
Associations and 
development 
agencies take part in 
multi-stakeholder 
projects/processes 
addressing demands 
in particular 
consumer/producer 
countries 
Role in standards 
transmission 
Setting requirements 
for suppliers / 
farmers; participate 
in training of 
farmers 
Co-develop 
adoption practices 
(e.g. multiple 
certification) 
Critical as certifiers, 
and trainers / 
educators within 
national contexts 
Role in standards 
selection 
Apply pressure on 
farmers to adopt 
particular standards 
rather than others 
(anticipating and/or 
responding to 
consumer demand) 
Producer structure 
affects adoptability 
of particular 
standards; producers 
apply pressure on 
standards setters for 
more compatible, 
less costly solutions 
No direct selection 
pressure once 
standards are 
created (yet they 
influence selection 
processes during 
standards 
development)  
 
Table 5: Role of different stakeholders in standards variation, transmission, and selection 
 
